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Abstract
The object of this article is to assess the causal impact of pro-
motions policies on students’ choice of the field of study. We match
the records of the students enrolled in two large universities with the
records of the participating schools. Within the participating schools,
some students took part in the program, while others did not. We
adopted an ”exposure” approach in which we define as treated all stu-
dents of a cohort that were eligible for these activities. We find, on
average, a positive and significant effect of the policy on targeted and
non-targeted scientific bachelor’s degrees and positive cross-treatment
effects across subjects. However, if the policy has a considerable influ-
ence on male students’ choices, it does not appear to have any effect on
female students’ choices. These findings suggest that the policy helped
students in correcting their labor market expectations for graduating
in science.
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1 Introduction
In the last decade, many developed countries have shown concern about sci-
entific education. In some cases the absolute number of students enrolled in
scientific and technological tracks increased, masking an overall expansion of
secondary and tertiary education. The share of students enrolled in science
and technology is, perhaps, a more appropriate indicator of the trend, as it
normalizes changes in the student population and demographic trends. The
evolution of the share of enrollments in scientific and technological studies at
the secondary and tertiary educational level has been decreasing overall in
most of the OECD countries over the last twenty years, though the number
of students in Engineering and Computer Science has increased. The pic-
ture is more serious when considering traditional scientific disciplines such
as Mathematics and Physics and when considering PhD programs, in which
the decline also occurred in absolute terms (OECD, 2008).
A reversal of this downward trend should be desirable for a variety of
reasons. First, R&D may become more difficult over time and a small num-
ber of scientists engaged in R&D can hinder economic growth (Segerstrom,
1998). Moreover, investing in studies that “bear” a higher chance of over-
education1 is inefficient. For instance, in the Italian context, investing in
quantitative fields (including Science) not only increases the participation
to the labor market and the probability of employment, but also early earn-
ings2 (Buonanno and Pozzoli, 2007). Furthermore, Webbink and Oosterbeek
(1997) show that there is an unexploited technical potential. That is, there
are some types of students who do no choose technical education, but when
they do they perform better than others. For example, female students
choose less often technical studies, but when they do, they perform better
than male students. In addition, the choice of the degree (considering that
girls choose less often scientific studies than boys) can explain 13% and up to
36% of the gender wage gap (Machin and Puhani , 2005). Therefore, more
female students in science would translate to a smaller gender gap. After
having briefly illustrated the importance of science, it is natural to wonder
what drives the choice of the field of study.
The existing literature agrees on the importance of expected earnings in
explaining the choice of the field of study. In a simultaneous model of field
and length of studies, Beffy et al. (2009) find that a 10% increase of expected
earnings in a given field results in a significant impact on the allocation of
students between fields. Montmarquette et al. (2002) define a model in
which the utility of choosing major k depends on the characteristics of the
individual and his expected income corresponding to major k, that in turn
1See, for example, Frenette (2004).
2However, this results could be due to the relative scarcity of those who graduated in
scientific fields (Ballarino and Bratti, 2006) and to the signal for high ability and flexibility
attached to Italian scientific graduates (Convert, 2005).
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depends on his perceived probability of success in major k, his expected
earnings after graduation for major k and the earnings alternatives. In
their model, preferences are an unobserved random component and they
also assume that expected earnings are always realized. They find that
expected earnings play a crucial role in college major choice, though the
importance of earnings is lower for females and for non-whites. In another
work, Boudabart and Montmarquette (2007) introduce a weight for expected
income as a function of student characteristics, such as family background,
and the probability of job-education skill match. They find a correlation
between male students choosing science and a vocation for high income
and for the acquisition of skills, while for female students choosing science
they do not find such a correlation. Berger (1988) stresses the importance
of the streams of future earnings versus early income (at the time of the
choice) as driving the students’ choice of college majors. Freeman et al.
(2008) introduce the role of the knowledge content of a job. That is, the
choice to undertake a specific major may be affected by the importance of
the competencies provided by that major in the labor market, which may
vary over years. They find that women, when choosing majors, are more
responsive to this aspect, while men are more responsive to changes in the
wage return of the knowledge content in a field. The different behavior of
males and females is a constant feature in the literature about the choice of
college major3, but this difference does not seem to be addressed at the level
of policy design. On the other hand, Arcidiacono (2004) argues that the large
exogenous monetary premiums for attending science (and business) courses
cannot explain the ability sorting across majors, due instead to differing
preferences for majors across abilities.
However, a non-decreasing payoff of science cannot explain why scientific
fields of study are chosen less often today than in past years. We agree with
Convert (2005) that this apparently puzzling fact can be explained by a
general (among the developed countries) expansion and democratization of
the education system, where the students more “adverse” to science or less
informed about studying science, like females and students with a low family
background, have entered higher education. At this point, a more general
question arises: can policy affect the choice of the field of study?
Some governments have attempted to attract more students in scientific
tracks. The policy instruments that have been used fall under two categories:
reduction of tuition fees and promotion of science studies. The first tool
merely reduces the direct cost of investments in scientific education, as it
is commonly assumed that the non-monetary costs of studying science are
higher than those of studying, for instance, humanities. The second kind of
intervention may play a role in the formation of the expectations about the
probability of finding a (proper) job and about earnings after majoring in
3See for example Zafar (2009).
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science and it may increase the non pecuniary returns of studying science by
stimulating the interest in scientific subjects. Moreover, promotion activities
may help students to familiarize themselves with scientific subjects and, as a
possible consequence, they may upgrade their perception of the probability
of success in scientific majors.
Italy is not an exception of the general trend of declining majoring in
science. In the next years there will be a generational turnover of high school
teachers and, in particular, new teachers of science are needed. Moreover,
the contribution of the private sector to the founding of research, a crucial
aspect for science, is 40% with respect to a European average of 53.4%
(Ministero della Pubblica Istruzione, 2007). The performance of 15 year-
old Italian students in science, reported by the survey OCSE-PISA 2006, is
not encouraging. Aware of this situation, in 2005 the Ministry of Education
and Research, the National Employers Organization (Confindustria) and the
Universities launched a program to boost enrollment in scientific bachelors
and to increase the number of graduates in science. With respect to the
first aim, the content of this policy was to promote scientific studies to high
school students.
This paper analyzes the impact of the sponsoring policy on enrollments
in Chemistry, Physics, Mathematics and Materials Science4 to see whether
it has been effective and, more in detail, for whom it worked and in which
fields. We match the records of the students enrolled in the two main public
universities of Milan with the records of the secondary schools that par-
ticipated to the program. We use an “exposure” approach to identify the
“intention” effect of the treatment. We find that the ”Progetto Lauree Scien-
tifiche” increased the probability to choose a scientific bachelor, on average,
by about 1.5%. The effect is not limited to the selected disciplines and there
are positive cross effects of treatment’s subject for Mathematics and Physics.
When considering a differential effect of the policy for males and females, we
find that for male students the policy was even more successful, with a shift
in the probability of enrollment in science equal to 3.5 percentage points,
while for female students it seems the policy had no effect.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses
the content and the functioning of the policy. Section 3 presents the available
data. Section 4 explains the “exposure” approach proposed to evaluate the
effect of the policy. Section 5 reports the descriptive statistics of our sample.
Section 6 presents our findings and Sections 7 adds some robustness checks.
Finally, Section 8 draws some conclusive remarks.
4Materials Science is a course of study in chemistry and physics of materials.
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2 The PLS policy
The “Progetto Lauree Scientifiche” (PLS) is a policy launched in 2005 by an
agreement between the Ministry of Education and Research, the National
Employers Organization and the National Committee of Science and Techno-
logical Universities to increase the enrollments and the number of graduates
in Chemistry, Physics, Mathematics and Materials Science. The distinguish-
ing characteristic of this project, with respect to previous interventions, is
the considerable amount of its founding and its coverage of the national
territory: 11 million euro invested and more than 30 universities involved5.
The program includes different interventions: 4 about the sponsoring of sci-
ence to students and the training of teachers at the secondary school level,
3 concerning university education, stage and post-graduate studies and 1
for scholarships and other activities at the tertiary level (Ministero della
Pubblica Istruzione, 2007). The first block of interventions aimed at in-
creasing enrollments in scientific bachelors programs and was intended for
high school students, while the other blocks aimed at increasing the number
of graduates in science and were intended for university students.
The present analysis focuses on what we think is the most innovative
content of this policy: the activities to promote scientific studies to sec-
ondary school students. The project was initially introduced for two years:
2005 and 2006. The content of this sponsoring policy is summarized by
an evocative sentence: “We need to change the idea that Math is boring,
Physics difficult and Chemistry dangerous” (page 10 of Ministero della Pub-
blica Istruzione (2007)). The activities to promote scientific studies to high
school students aimed, on the one hand, at stimulating the interest in sub-
jects that are commonly deemed to be boring and, on the other, they aimed
at filling the gap between the perception of the professions one can undertake
after these studies and the variety of the applications they can have (both in
terms of the width of labor opportunities and the social utility of these stud-
ies). In practice, the project organized lab activities stimulating an active
participation of students and experiments to show the links between science
and everyday life. A second, but not minor, pillar upon which the project
is focused is the involvement of secondary school teachers to stimulate the
interest of their students in science, realized through training and support
for lab activities provided by university professors and researchers.
The target of the policy was students of the last three years of the sec-
ondary cycle of education. 50000 students, 20000 teachers and 2000 high
schools6 participated in these activities in the entire national territory (Min-
istero della Pubblica Istruzione, 2007). The PLS deliberately intended to
attract students according to their interest. The rationale of the policy was
5Only two regions were not involved in the program: Valle d’Aosta and Molise.
6Schools are counted twice if they participated to two activities.
5
to boost an underlying propensity or ability for scientific studies and not
to create it. The explicit aim was to increase the matriculations in the
bachelors of Chemistry, Physics, Mathematics and Materials Science.
Originally, all secondary schools received an official communication about
the PLS policy, but few of them were actually involved in this way. In most
of the cases the universities that organized these activities relied on e-mails,
personal contacts with teachers and principals and on teacher-to-teacher ad-
vertising. Once the organizers of the activities had a reference person in a
school, through one or more teachers or the principal, the participation could
occur with one or more classes or with small groups of students, depend-
ing on the type of activity. The teacher of reference was not necessarily the
teacher of the students involved, as the program was limited to the last three
years of high school. Furthermore, many activities were mainly targeted to
the last or before last year students of high school and could take place in
the first or the second semester of the school year. From direct interviews
that we had with the organizers of the activities, it often happened that
the decision of a school to participate with the 4th or 5th grade depended
on the collocation of the activity in the first or second semester. In the
second semester many 5th graders were busy preparing for their final exam.
Students could participate in one or more activities, in one or more of the
four subjects. Finally, the program organized a survey of the participants
to assess their evaluation of the activities.
The PLS policy may have affected three aspects regarding the choice of
the field of study. First, practical examples of professions linked with every
day life may have “corrected” the labor market expectations related to grad-
uates in science. Second, the proposal of non-standard activities may have
increased the non-pecuniary returns of studying science. Finally, the time
spent following the PLS activities may have helped students to familiarize
themselves with scientific subjects and increased students’ expectations of
success in studying science. While the first aspect may, according to the
literature, affect mostly male students, the second aspect could be more
important for female students.
3 Data
We anticipate the section about the data as the (non) availability of (proper)
data has constrained the empirical strategy. Thus, we explain which data
we have and in the next section, given the data, which strategy we use.
We had access to the data of the students’ enrollments in the two public
universities of Milan: Universita` degli Studi di Milano and Universita` degli
Studi Milano-Bicocca, containing the records of the high school attended by
the student and its address, the year of enrollment, the year, age and mark
of the final high school diploma, the type of school, gender, family income
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bracket and the chosen bachelor. The data cover four school years: from
2004 to 20077.
A second dataset contains the information of the high schools partic-
ipating in the program, with the address of the school, the subject of the
program in which the school was involved, the year of involvement and
the grades involved or the grade that individual students attended when
participating. This dataset corresponds to the questionnaires submitted to
the participants of the PLS after they completed the activities. About the
questionnaires the program defined three cases: for some activities the ques-
tionnaires had to be filled in by individual students, for others they had to
be filled in at the class level, whereas for some activities (especially for the
more general ones, such as the showing of movies about science, museum
visits and so on) the program did not request to fill out any questionnaires.
Some information about school participation was missing. We collected the
remaining information through direct contact with the professors who orga-
nized these activities. We then matched these two datasets by the address
of the secondary school.
It was not possible to link the information about program’s participation
at the individual level, even for the questionnaires filled out by the students,
as the dataset about the program’s participation does not contain an indi-
vidual identifier. Since the corrections we made on the two data-sets and
the recovery of the missing information was considerably time consuming,
we restricted the analysis to the students enrolled in the two universities of
Milan, having attended a high school in the province of Milan.
It is worth noting that among the students having attended the sec-
ondary school in the province of Milan and among those that decided to con-
tinue studying at the tertiary level, about 90% enrolled at a university in the
same region and among them, 93% enrolled at a university in the province
of Milan8. However, Milan has several universities: the Catholic University
(15.6%9), the IULM (2.8%), the Bocconi University (7.2%), the Politecnico
(21.4%) and few medical and art institutions (2.2%). The Catholic Univer-
sity of Milan does not offer bachelors degrees in science: they are instead
offered at a campus located in a city 85 km away from Milan10. Similarly,
the IULM, the Bocconi University and the Politecnico do not offer bachelors
in science, though the Politecnico offers “competing” scientific bachelors de-
grees such as Engineering. The Statale and Bicocca Universities enroll about
51% of all the students enrolled in one of the universities of Milan, including
those who do not provide courses in science and including students from
7These years correspond to the school year 2004/2005 to 2007/2008.
8See www.anagrafe.miur.it.
9The total is the overall number of students enrolled in one of the universities of Milan,
including students from other provinces, regions and countries. See www.sistemauni.it.
10Brescia.
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other provinces, regions and countries11. Furthermore, the activities of the
PLS program were organized by the two universities for which we have the
data. It might be that the policy pushed some students to undertake a sci-
entific bachelor’s degree, but at a university for which we do not have the
data: for instance at the University of Pavia. For the facts listed above we
think that the two public universities of Milan constitute a natural outcome
for most of the students for which the policy could have had an effect. In
any case, this aspect should not invalidate our analysis, as long as the policy
does not have an effect on the choice of the place of study.
The final dataset contains the records of students coming from 320 dif-
ferent secondary schools, out of which 56 were involved in the program. The
participating schools “sent” to the two universities 14172 students from 2004
to 2007. From this matched sample we exclude the (few) schools that do
not have a stable number of students enrolled in the two universities over
the four year period 2004-2007. We also drop the students with a gap year
between the diploma and the first year of matriculation. The final sam-
ple includes 6333 observations for post-policy years (2006 and 2007). The
schools could participate in the PLS in 2005 and/or 2006, with the 5th or
the 4th grade. In these schools 46% of the students were exposed to the
activities organized by the PLS program since its inception, corresponding
to 3371 individuals for 2006 and 2007.
From the data about the project’s participation for which the number
of participants is available12, we know that an average of approximately 16
students participated for each high school’s cohort. We also know that in our
final data about university enrollments, each high school (of the province of
Milan) “sent”, on average, 64 students (living in the province of Milan) per
year. If all the participants to the PLS enrolled in the two public universities
of Milan, then 25% of the “exposed” cohorts were actually treated13.
4 Empirical strategy
The aim of the analysis is to estimate the effect of the PLS sponsoring policy
on the enrollment of students in the targeted scientific bachelors programs.
As this policy was not designed to be a randomized experiment, the effect
of the participation to the PLS may be confounded by several factors. First,
the schools involved may be the schools that better prepare students for
scientific faculties. Second, the students who participated to the program
could be the students most interested in science. Third, the classes that
participated can have, for instance, better teachers of scientific subjects.
11See www.sistemauni.it.
12The number of participants is not available for all the PLS activities and, in any case,
for the individual questionnaires it just corresponds to the number of participants who
actually answered the questionnaire.
13However, we do not know who they are.
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Last, a school may have participated with some classes of the 4th grade
cohort because there were not similar students in the 5th grade cohort.
In order to avoid the confounding effect of schools’ self-selection, we only
consider the secondary schools involved in the sponsoring policy, where we
can find both the students who participated to the policy and the students
who did not. The results are limited to the effect of the policy for the schools
that chose to participate. To avoid the confounding effect of students’ and
classes’ self-selection and, also, for the constraints imposed by the data14,
we adopt an “exposure” approach15. That is, we assign the treatment to
the whole cohort of each school where one or more classes or some students
of the same cohort were involved in the program. In this way the treatment
effect is comparable to an intention to treat effect. Usually, the intention
to treat effect is used in randomized trials when non compliance may be
non random16. In this case we use the intention to treat because the actual
treatment is likely endogenous and because we do not have information
on actual participants. If we had the information on actual participants
we could have used it to estimate an upper bound of the treatment or we
could have used the school/cohort “exposure” as an instrumental variable
for actual participation. In order to be eligible for the treatment the student
should have been in school S in grade g in year t. The actual treatment
effect corresponds to the treatment coefficient divided by the proportion of
students for each cohort in each school that actually participated in the
program. The intention to treat coefficient is a lower bound of the actual
treatment effect.
Just to give an example, let’s say that school B was involved in the
project in 2005 with one class in the 4th grade cohort. A student in the 4th
grade in 2005 can enroll at the university in 2007. We define as treated all
the students from that cohort of school B. If school C participated in the
program in 2006 with some students of the 4th grade, school C is included in
the analysis and its students enrolled at the university in year 2006 and 2007
are included in the control group. Indeed, “exposed” students of school C
can enroll at the university at the earliest in 2008, but our data only include
enrollments in 2006 and 2007. The Table below illustrates the mechanism
of the treatment’s assignment:
14We cannot link the (in any case, incomplete) individual data about PLS’ participation
to the university administrative data.
15The “exposure” approach is generally used when a given policy has an effect spread
over a certain subpopulation, identified, for instance, by the date and region of birth. For
an application see Bratti et al. (2008) and Oppedisano (2009).
16See for example Angrist and Lavy (2002).
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year and class PLS → year enroll. school A school B school C school D
2005 5th grade → 2006 T C T C
2005 4th (2006 5th) → 2007 C T T C
2006 4th grade → 2008 C C C T
The identification of the treatment effect together with school-specific
effects and a time trend is allowed by the within and between school year
and/or grade variation of the exposure to the treatment. The interpretation
of the treatment effect relies on the assumption that school-specific cohorts
are comparable within school and between (participating) schools, condi-
tioning on the pre-policy share of students of the school enrolled in scientific
faculties. In other words, in this framework school participation reveals a
pre-existing interest toward science, selection into the program occurs at
school, class and individual level, but the choice of the timing and the grade
for the participation to the program is not correlated with an underlying
motivation of the school-specific cohort toward science and we assume that
in each grade of each school we can always find a portion of students and/or
teachers more interested in science than others.
The basic idea of this approach is that the cohort’s composition of stu-
dents and teachers in each school should be more stable and less selective
than class variation or students’ variation, in terms of motivation toward sci-
ence. For example, science teachers can teach in more cohorts in the same
school and the potential manipulation of student allocation may occur when
forming classes and not for the cohorts, that are determined by the age of
the students. However, it could still be possible that a cohort in a school
is systematically different from another cohort in the same school or from a
cohort in another school and that this difference drives the participation (of
a portion of these cohorts) into the program. In Section 7 we will introduce
some variables to control for observable school/cohort characteristics. The
resulting model is:
y ∗ics |(U = 1) = α+ βCc + γSs + ξXics + δtreatcs + εics (1)
yics =
{
1 if y∗ics > 0
0 if y∗ics ≤ 0
ε ∼ (0, pi2/3)
where y∗ics is the latent propensity to attend a scientific faculty of the
ith student in the cth cohort in the sth school, Cc is a dummy for the cohort
to capture the trend, Ss is the pre-policy rate of enrollment in scientific
bachelor programs for each school and X is a vector of students’ charac-
teristics (gender, final grade of diploma, having repeated one or two grades
during high school, family income bracket). The variable treatcs is defined
as belonging to a high school’s cohort in which some classes or some stu-
dents participated to one or more activities organized by the PLS. These
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students are not necessarily actual participants but, among them, some ac-
tually participated. Thus, the coefficient δ is an intention to treat effect and
the average treatment effect for the treated in the participating schools.
As we consider only the participating schools and we do not assign the
treatment at the individual or class level, we do not have to deal with possi-
ble unobservable and confounding factors such as ηs, υi and νg, respectively,
at the school, individual and class level, unless the intensity and the timing
of the treatment is systematically related to the underlying motivation to-
ward science. The outcome yics is a binary variable for whether or not the
student attends a bachelor in Chemistry, Physics, Mathematics or Materials
Sciences. We have to condition on U (equal to one if the student is enrolled
at the university) as we do not have data about the students of the sth high
school that do not enroll at the university. Hence, with this model we can-
not disentangle the effect of the treatment on the probability to go to the
university to follow a scientific track from the effect on the probability to
choose a scientific track, once chosen to go to the university (independently
from the policy). The coefficient δ includes both mechanisms. Finally, since
the error terms may be correlated within school and cohort and the coeffi-
cient of interest is defined at this level, we cluster by school and cohort to
capture common unobservable shocks to students in the same school and
cohort. We allow for an unrestricted correlation structure.
5 Descriptive statistics
Figure 1 shows the trend of the share of the enrollments at the two univer-
sities of Milan in Chemistry, Physics, Mathematics and Materials Sciences
from 2004 to 2007, separately for the schools participating in the PLS and
those that did not. The vertical line corresponds to the year in which the
policy may have started to have an effect on these enrollments. The positive
change in the trend at the point the policy was introduced for the group of
the schools involved is clearcut, especially in the first year of its implementa-
tion. Figure 2 shows the same picture, but with the absolute number of the
enrollments in the four sciences rather than the share on the total number
of enrollments. The difference in the trends for the two groups of schools
is slightly more pronounced than in Figure 1. The participating schools al-
ready had a larger share and absolute number of students enrolled in science
before the policy was introduced, but the steep increase after 2005 is consid-
erable. In the first year after the introduction of the policy the effect seems
to be driven by Physics, while in the second year by Chemistry. Indeed, in
2006 13% of students were exposed to a treatment in Physics, while only
6% the following year. The opposite is true for Chemistry: 5% were treated
in 2006 and 42% in 2007.
[insert Figure 1 about here] [insert Figure 2 about here]
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Figure 3 shows the trend in science’s enrollments for males and females,
in non participating and participating schools. If for females the increase in
enrollments for the participating schools seems to happen only in the first
year after the introduction of the policy, for male the increase is notable and
constant over the following two years. Figure 4 shows the difference between
the share of students enrolled in science between the cohorts exposed and
not exposed to the treatment, only for the participating schools. Figure 4
seems to confirm that the gain from being exposed to the policy is higher
for males than for females.
[insert Figure 3 about here]
[insert Figure 4 about here]
Tables 1 and 2 report the descriptive statistics of the sample of par-
ticipating schools, by treatment status. Table 1 reports mean values using
students as the unit of measurement, while Table 2 is calculated using co-
horts as the unit of measurement. When we assign equal weight to each
cohort, the only significant difference between treated and controls is the
year of enrollment. On the other hand, if we assign a weight to the cohorts
proportional to their number of students we find that the treated and con-
trol students differ in the pre-policy share of enrollments in science and in
the share of males of the high school of provenience. However, the share of
males is not a pre-treatment variable. Thus, the descriptive characteristics
reported in Tables 1 and 2 do not seem to seriously invalidate our cohort
approach, where we would basically like to have the treated and non treated
cohorts as similar as possible.
[insert Table 1 about here]
[insert Table 2 about here]
6 Empirical findings
Table 3 reports the estimation of equation 1. In order to interpret the
results in terms of probabilities we also report the corresponding marginal
effects. The attended high school’s pre-policy share of students enrolled in a
scientific track is the major determinant of the choice of a scientific bachelor.
Male students are 8% more likely to choose a scientific track and the higher
the mark of the diploma, the higher this chance. On the other side, students
who failed a grade during secondary school are less likely to choose science
at the university. There is no significant trend in the enrollment of science
between 2006 and 2007, that we could interpret as a stable (perceived)
labor market reward for choosing a scientific track. Introducing a control
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for family income does not change the results. The possibility to participate
in the PLS project significantly increases by 1.4% the probability to enroll
in scientific faculties. By using a liner probability model the effect raises
to 1.9%. Thus, for the cohorts who had the chance to participate, the
treatment shifts upward the probability to enroll in science. We gather all
four scientific bachelor degree in one dummy for science studies or “other
studies”. We have to remember that only a small fraction of the cohorts
defined as treated have actually been treated. For this reason we expect the
actual (individual) effect of the PLS policy to be higher than that found
here.
[insert Table 3 about here]
As the figures reported in this paper suggest, it is worthwhile to in-
vestigate whether the effect of the treatment is the same for males and for
females. By calculating a proper interaction effect between treatment and
gender17, we indeed find that the positive effect of the policy is driven by
male students. The effect of treatment for males is 3.5% higher than for
females with a z-value of 2.1 and this effect dominates for most of the values
of the other control variables. Figure 5 shows this result.
[insert Figure 5 about here]
The treatment includes activities in Chemistry, Physics, Mathematics
or Materials Sciences. We expect an effect of the subject-specific treatment
on the choice of the same subject as the activity attended, but we do not
exclude that it can have an effect on the other three scientific subjects. Table
4 shows the cross treatment effect for each of the four scientific subjects.
We restrict the analysis to the students who participated in the activities in
only one subject, to avoid the correlation between participations in different
subject-specific activities. As expected, the effects are found on the diagonal.
However, we cannot give a causal interpretation of these coefficients, as
cohorts more inclined toward one subject may choose to participate (even the
small fraction) in the activities in that specific subject. Interestingly, there
are cross effects for Mathematics and Physics. Participating in activities
about Physics has a positive effect on choosing Mathematics and vice versa.
[insert Table 4 about here]
In addition, the policy was intended to promote the four mentioned
scientific subjects, but there may be supplementary effects. First, if the
17In a non linear model framework, this interaction effect corresponds to the cross
derivative of the bachelor choice equation with respect to gender and treatment and not
to the single derivative with respect to the interaction gender and treatment. For the
calculation we used the Stata command inteff (Ai and Norton, 2003).
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policy diverted potential students from other scientific fields not included
in the policy’s target, it would not be considered a full success. As already
mentioned, the policy can act in two ways: by redistributing students across
faculties and by increasing the number of students that choose to purse their
studies at the university to follow a scientific track. The first mechanism can,
in turn, work by redistributing students from overcrowded tracks or from
other scientific and reasonably non rival tracks, according to the philosophy
of the policy. Last, the policy can have a positive effect on other bachelors.
Table 5 shows that the policy does not appear to have diverted students
from other scientific and quantitative bachelors. Moreover, there is a strong
positive and significant effect of the treatment on Pharmacy, reasonably due
to the fact that this faculty also includes a course of study in Chemistry and
Pharmaceutical Technologies.
[insert Table 5 about here]
This result, together with the increase in the absolute number of male
enrollments from the participating schools, might point in favor of the mech-
anism of the policy as boosting students to go to the university in order to
follow a bachelors degree in science.
7 Robustness checks
The treated and untreated groups differ in some (omitted) characteristics
that could bias the result about the project’s participation. In fact, the
cohort’s composition in each school may reflect the learning environment of
the students of our sample, through the peer effect or as a result of common
shocks as in a case where teachers are assigned to cohorts according to the
characteristics of the students. In other words, the difference in some ob-
servable characteristics between treated and untreated cohorts can have an
effect itself on the choice of scientific bachelors and not merely through the
treatment status. In order to check this possibility we perform an estima-
tion including controls for cohorts’ average characteristics in each school18.
Results are reported in the first column of Table 6. Column 2 reports the
marginal effects. Cohorts’ average characteristics do play a role in the choice
of college major, especially the share of grade repeaters and the proportion
of males. Conditional on the average characteristics, the treatment coef-
ficient is slightly reduced to 1.3% as well as the corresponding standard
error. Unfortunately, we do not have pre-treatment characteristics. There-
fore, the selection of cohorts into treatment may have not been based on
these characteristics and they could not represent the actual learning envi-
ronment of the student. They could be, instead, an effect of the treatment
18Average characteristics are calculated excluding the ith observation for each observa-
tion.
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on the university’s enrollment. In particular, we cannot exclude that the
project’s participation had an effect on male university’s enrollment. In
column 3 and 4 of Table 6 we report the results by replacing the share of
males for the school/cohort combination that the student belongs to with
the average share of males in the same school for the two cohorts preceding
the introduction of the policy. With this latter specification the treatment
coefficient is confirmed to increase by around 1.4-1.5% the probability to
choose a scientific bachelor, with a confidence level within 5%.
[insert Table 6 about here]
As explained in Section 2 the PLS policy also provided training courses
for secondary school teachers. We know the year of participation, the school
the teachers were involved with and that they were teachers of the last three
grades of the high school. We cannot identify the effect of teacher training
as all cohorts of students in our data, coming from the schools where these
teachers were working, would be defined as treated. In other words, teacher
training is introduced as a school level control. As a robustness check we
insert in our specification a control for teacher training for the students that
could have had these teachers. If we cannot interpret the effect of teacher
training on student enrollment in science, the omission of this variable could
distort our results. For instance, if the students that are classified in the
control group are the students of the teachers that received the training, the
coefficient of the treatment for the students’ activities could be underesti-
mated. This more precise specification strengthens our results: conditional
on teachers’ training, the treatment increases by 1.5% the probability to
choose a scientific bachelor, with a confidence level of 4.4% (regression not
reported).
8 Final remarks
The intuition of the PLS policy seems right: policy interventions should be
made before the choice of the field is made by the students. This is contrary
to interventions such as the reduction of tuition fees in science that in Italy,
for example, act ex-post. The policy succeeded in increasing enrollments in
Chemistry, Physics, Mathematics, Materials Sciences and, unintentionally,
in Pharmacy. Participating in activities in one subject is correlated with
the probability of enrolling in a bachelor’s program in that subject but not
exclusively, as in the case of the students participating in the activities of
Physics and Mathematics. For these subjects, the PLS project seems to
boost a general attitude toward a scientific approach, rather than a specific
interest in the selected disciplines.
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Nonetheless, a more accurate insight into the effect of the policy leads
to a somehow different conclusion. The policy was very effective for male
students, but there seems to be no effect for female students. Having partic-
ipated in the treatment raises the probability of enrolling in a scientific track
by 3.5 percentage points for males with respect to females and this result
holds for most of the values of the other characteristics of the student. If we
follow the existing literature on the choice of college major, as depending on
expected income, being a function of the probability to find a (proper) job
and of expected earnings, and on a non-pecuniary utility of studying science,
we believe that the PLS policy was more effective in tackling the first issue.
Indeed, if males react more than females to changes in expected income and
treated males benefit the most from the policy, we can imagine that these
activities helped students in correcting their labor market expectations for
graduating in science.
Overall, our results are robust to different specifications and poorly
sensitive to controls for additional factors such as cohorts’ average charac-
teristics and teacher training activities. The effect of the treatment on the
probability to choose a scientific bachelor ranges from 1.3% to 1.8%. It is
worthwhile to note that the effect that we identify with the cohort approach
is an intention to treat effect. Consequently, we expect the actual (individ-
ual) effect of participating in the PLS activities to be somehow higher and
the higher, the lower the proportion of students actually treated on the size
of the same cohort enrolled at the university. For instance, if this proportion
were 20% of the cohorts classified as treated, the actual policy effect could
go up to 17.5% for males. From the analysis we can also deduce that the
policy worked through pushing students that would not have chosen to pur-
sue their studies at the university to follow a scientific track, rather than by
redistributing students across bachelors programs. Indeed, we do not find a
negative effect of the PLS policy on the enrollments in other bachelors and
the data show an increase in the absolute number of the students of science.
The overall cost of the 7 projects organized by the universities of Mi-
lan (2 for Chemistry, 2 for Physics, 2 for Mathematics and 1 for Materials
Science) was 717838 euro, including the activities to train high school teach-
ers. A 1.5% effect of the policy19 for our sample of treated schools/cohorts
including 3371 students means that 51 students chose a scientific bachelor
thanks to the policy. Thus, the (maximum) cost to have one student more
studying science is about 14000 euro20. An extension of this research could
be to estimate the benefit of having one student more studying science.
The limitation of our study is the short sight of our evaluation, due to
the fact that the “Progetto Lauree Scientifiche” is a policy introduced very
19We are just considering the effect of the sponsoring activities for high school students
and not the effect of teacher training (as we do not know the magnitude of this effect).
20This per capita estimation is valid only if the effect of teacher training on the students’
choice of scientific bachelor is zero, otherwise this amount is an overestimation of the costs.
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recently. We do not know if what we identify as a success will become a later
drop-out from science bachelors and/or if it translates to a lower academic
performance of the students boosted to study science.
It would be interesting to compare these findings with other studies on the
effect of policies sponsoring scientific majors, especially for policies designed
to be a randomized experiment. Our results, supported by the existing
literature, would suggest to paying more attention to gender differences
in the choice of college major when designing policies to sponsor scientific
studies.
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Figure 1: Trend of the share of enrollments in science, by school participation
in PLS
Figure 2: Trend of the number of enrollments in science, by school partici-
pation in PLS
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Figure 3: Trend of the number of enrollments in science, by school partici-
pation and gender
Figure 4: Gap in the share of enrollments in science between treated and
control group, by gender
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Table 1: Descriptive statistics (with students as unit of observation)
control group treated group difference
Science 0.080 0.105 -0.025**
(0.005) (0.005) (0.007)
Pre-policy share science (per school) 0.052 0.057 -0.005**
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
enrollment 2007 0.346 0.671 -0.325**
(0.001) (0.001) (0.012)
Male 0.434 0.487 -0.053**
(0.009) (0.009) (0.013)
Mark diploma 0.031 -0.012 0.042
(0.018) (0.018) (0.025)
Fail 0.136 0.147 -0.011
(0.006) (0.006) (0.009)
N 3102 3231 6333
Table 2: Descriptive statistics (with cohorts as unit of observation)
control cohorts treated cohorts difference
Science 0.080 0.106 -0.026
(0.011) (0.010) (0.015)
Pre-policy share science (per school) 0.058 0.057 -0.002
(0.005) (0.004) (0.007)
enrollment 2007 0.348 0.691 -0.343**
(0.058) (0.063) (0.086)
Male 0.524 0.550 -0.027
(0.033) (0.031) (0.046)
Mark diploma -0.044 -0.014 0.030
(0.040) (0.049) (0.063)
Fail 0.172 0.171 -0.000
(0.019) (0.015) (0.025)
N 69 55 124
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Table 3: Main effect of the participation in the PLS program
Logit Marginal effects OLS
Pre-policy share science 9.4269** 0.5536** 0.7770**
(1.5574) (0.0920) (0.1334)
enrollment 2007 -0.0144 -0.0008 0.0016
(0.1244) (0.0073) (0.0092)
Male 1.2758** 0.0816** 0.0981**
(0.0939) (0.0076) (0.0094)
Mark diploma 0.7687** 0.0451** 0.0641**
(0.0548) (0.0031) (0.0059)
Failure -0.4173* -0.0216* -0.0230*
(0.2071) (0.0096) (0.0101)
Treatment 0.2450* 0.0144* 0.0186*
(0.1235) (0.0073) (0.0092)
N 6333 6333 6333
Legend: † p<0.10 ∗ p<0.05 ∗∗ p<0.01. Standard errors are clustered by school and
cohort. Marginal effects calculated at mean values.
Figure 5: PLS treatment effect heterogenous by gender
23
Table 4: Cross subject-specific treatment effects on each subject
Chemistry Physics Math Mat Sc
Chemistry treatment 0.4874† -0.3253 0.0166 0.2392
(0.2767) (0.4579) (0.2848) (0.3994)
Physics treatment -0.0632 0.5620* 1.1245** -1.2700
(0.2617) (0.2585) (0.2728) (0.9217)
Mathematics treatment -0.1178 0.5449* 0.6292* -0.5599
(0.2105) (0.2592) (0.2522) (0.7159)
Materials Sciences treatment -0.1281 0.0044 -0.0837 0.8906*
(0.3458) (0.2440) (0.3626) (0.3635)
N 5697 5697 5697 5697
Legend: † p<0.10 ∗ p<0.05 ∗∗ p<0.01. Control variables for each estimation not
reported in the table are as in Table 3. Standard errors are clustered by school and
cohort.
Table 5: PLS treatment effect on other bachelor programs
treatment
Biotechnology 0.0047
(0.1621)
Biology 0.1471
(0.1348)
Pharmacy 0.3393*
(0.1341)
Environmental Sciences -0.2718
(0.4076)
Geology 0.5024
(0.3405)
Economics -0.2000
(0.1706)
Medicine 0.2028
(0.2554)
Statistics -0.2987
(0.3143)
Legend: † p<0.10 ∗ p<0.05 ∗∗ p<0.01. Standard errors are clustered by school and
cohort.
24
Table 6: Estimation with cohort’s average characteristics
Logit Mfx Logit Mfx
Pre-policy share science 7.4287** 0.4242** 7.9608** 0.4579**
(1.6249) (0.0926) (1.6281) (0.0928)
enrollment 2007 -0.0137 -0.0008 -0.0135 -0.0008
(0.1090) (0.0062) (0.1107) (0.0064)
Male 1.2142** 0.0751** 1.2234** 0.0763**
(0.1032) (0.0074) (0.1047) (0.0076)
Mark diploma 0.7706** 0.0440** 0.7705** 0.0443**
(0.0549) (0.0029) (0.0547) (0.0029)
Fail -0.3845 -0.0195* -0.3838 -0.0196*
(0.2078) (0.0095) (0.2075) (0.0096)
Cohort’s share male 1.3889** 0.0793**
(0.3310) (0.0185)
Cohort’s share male (pre) 1.1639** 0.0669**
(0.3129) (0.0181)
Cohort’s av mark diploma 0.1023 0.0058 0.0978 0.0056
(0.2570) (0.0147) (0.2656) (0.0153)
Cohort’s share fail -3.0149** -0.1722** -2.7224** -0.1566**
(0.7445) (0.0414) (0.6889) (0.0397)
Treatment 0.2244* 0.0128* 0.2539* 0.0146*
(0.1102) (0.0063) (0.1123) (0.0065)
N 6333 6333 6333 6333
Legend: † p<0.10 ∗ p<0.05 ∗∗ p<0.01. Standard errors are clustered by school and
cohort. Marginal effects in columns 2 and 4 are calculated at mean values.
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